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We propose a practical quantum oblivious transfer and a bit commitment
protocols which replace the single-photon source with weak coherent pulses
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1. Introduction
Quantum oblivious transfer(QOT) and quantum bit commitment(QBC)
protocols are basic aspects of quantum cryptography. The study of QOT
was started by Cre´peau and Kilian [1]. In 1992, a practical QOT protocol
was been proposed [2]. However, in these two protocols, if Bob measures the
pulses after Alice discloses the bases, he will get both messages and Alice’s
privacy can be destroyed. In 1993, a well-known QBC scheme was been pre-
sented [3], which usually referred to as BCJL scheme was once believed as a
provably secure scheme. Cre´peau proposed a QOT protocol [4] on top of this
QBC scheme in 1994 to ensure Bob cannot delay his measurement. Then
Yao proved it a secure protocol based on the security of QBC [5]. Unfortu-
nately, Mayers found that the BCJL scheme was insecure [6]. Later, Mayers,
Lo and Chau separately present no-go theorem and prove that there is no
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non-interactive quantum bit commitment protocols with statistical security
[7–9]. Therefore, researchers believe that QOT protocols whose security are
usually based on QBC are insecure.
However, it isn’t the only way to construct a QOT protocol based on QBC.
Several researchers have made efforts in this direction[10–12]. In this paper,
we construct a random oblivious transfer protocol based on non-orthogonal
states transmission over a quantum channel. Then, as that usually do in
modern cryptography[13], construct a one-out-of-two oblivious transfer pro-
tocol on top of the R-OT protocol. In this scheme, Alice does not tell Bob
the bases and there is no need to forbid Bob to delay the measurement by
QBC protocols[14]. The protocols can be applied in the practical applica-
tion allowing the imperfect of sources, the quantum channel and detectors.
Then we present a bit commitment protocol based on this QOT protocol.
Considering error-correcting code and tolerable error rate, we describe the
protocols in detail and analyze the security and problem we probably face to
in practice.
2. Conditions in practice
As a practical protocol, these situations should be considered:
1. Alice’s emission apparatus. As practical and efficient single-photon
sources have yet to be realized, weak coherent pulses with typical av-
erage photon number of µS which can be easily prepared by standard
semiconductor lasers and calibrated attenuators are used in the follow-
ing protocols. The error rate caused by the emission apparatus is εS.
A pulse is requested to contain only one kind of polarization but more
than one photons in a pulse are allowed.
2. Channel loss and error. The existence of channel loss leads to an im-
perfect transfer efficiency. And the noises in channel lead to channel
error. Suppose the transfer efficiency of the channel is ηC , the error
rate caused by channel is εC .
3. Bob’s detection apparatus. In practice it is impossible that Bob has
detectors with perfect efficiency. The quantum efficiency ηD is the
probability that the detector registers a count when one photon comes
in. And the error rate caused by the detection apparatus is εD, which
the main error source is the dark count d.
2
To simplify the protocol, assume that Alices emission apparatus and Bobs
detection apparatus are both prepared by the trusted third party. They all
know the quantum efficiency ηD, the dark count rate d of Bobs detectors
and the typical average photon number µS of light pulses that Alice will
send to Bob and the transfer efficiency ηC . Suppose the the typical average
photon number in detectors is µ = µSηCηD, the overall error rate is ε =
1− (1− εS)(1− εC)(1− εD).
3. Practical protocols
Definition 1. (Random Oblivious Transfer (R-OT) Channel) Alice
sends a random bit r to Bob via a channel, if
1. Bob obtains the bit value r with a probability p satisfies 0 < β < p < α,
α < 1
2
, α and β are any two real numbers;
2. Alice cannot know whether Bob has get the value of her bit.
Then, the channel is named a R-OT channel (an extended Rabin’s OT chan-
nel).
To construct a quantum R-OT protocol, we use two non-orthogonal states.
There is no measuring apparatus can distinguish between these two states
with certainty, only some probabilistic information can be obtained. Let Al-
ice send a sequence of photons in two quantum states |Ψ0〉, |Ψ1〉 randomly,
where 〈Ψ0|Ψ1〉 = cosϕ. Here we choose ϕ = pi6 . Although there are kinds
of measurements for Bob, to simplify the protocol to be a practical one,
we choose an easy one: Bob measures the coming photons in two basis,
B0 = {|Ψ0〉, |Ψ0〉⊥} and B1 = {|Ψ1〉, |Ψ1〉⊥} randomly. If his measurement
results in |Ψx〉, he could not distinguish which state was sent by Alice. If
his measurement results in |Ψ⊥x⊕1〉, orthogonal to |Ψx⊕1〉, he know that the
initial state could not be |Ψx⊕1〉 and therefore was |Ψx〉. In an ideal world,
Alice’s probability of sending |Ψx〉 is 12 and Bob’s probability of detecting a
proton in Bx⊕1 is also 12 . Therefore, the probability of getting a conclusive
result is
pideal =
1
2
× 1
2
〈Ψx|Ψ⊥x⊕1〉〈Ψ⊥x⊕1|Ψx〉 × 2 =
1
2
sin2
pi
6
=
1
8
(1)
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Protocol 1. Practical quantum R-OT protocol
1. Alice and Bob decide on a series of security parameters. The number
of photons in a pules with typical average photon number of µS obey
Poisson distribution.
pn(µS) =
e−µSµnS
n!
(2)
Form Equation (2), the probability of no photons in the pulse is p0(µS) =
e−µS . It is easily to see the Poisson probability of detecting the photons
in a pulse with typical average photon number µS through a channel
with transfer efficiency ηC by a detector with quantum efficiency ηD
is 1 − e−µ. They can set the fraction a which is the probability Alice
expects Bob to detect successfully around to 1− e−µ and set error rate
εset to ε or a little bit higher to allow other noises. The parameters
are in accord with the equation H(2εset) <
1
2
− (1− e−µS − µSe−µS)/2a
to resist photon number splitting attack[2]. They agree on a security
parameter N which will be used below. They choose an information
reconciliation scheme for about aN bits words with expected error rate
εset. After using these, the error rate will reduce to ε
′
1.
2. Alice and Bob perform two tests with their apparatus.
First, they compare the sending time ti with the receiving time t
′
i for
each pulse. Since the distance between them is fixed, they can easily get
the traveling time θ, i.e. θ = t′i − ti. This test can not only mark the
address of each pulse, but also decrease the error caused by noises and
dark counts.
Second, Alice sends sequence of pulses through a quantum channel and
tells Bob the bases of the pulses through a classical channel. Bob de-
tects the pulses in the other bases. If and only if he detects the pulses
successfully with a probability greater than a and a error rate less than
εset, he agrees to continue the protocol. Otherwise, they take counsel
together to adjust the parameter a or εset.
3. Bob prepares a random qubit string |Φ1〉, ..., |Φn〉 and sends it to Alice,
where |Φi〉 ∈ {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}
4. Alice generates random bit string (r1, ..., rN) ∈ {0, 1}N . When ri = 0,
she keeps the ith qubit unchanged and sends it back to Bob; when ri = 1,
4
she rotates the state along y axis with pi
6
, and sends the qubit back to
Bob, that is  ri = 0, |Φi〉 −→ |Φi〉,ri = 1, |Φi〉 −→ |Φi + pi
6
〉
She also tells Bob the sending time ti of each pulses through a classical
channel, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}.
5. Bob tells Alice the receiving time of the receiving pulses. The number of
them is expected to be aN . He chooses B0 or B1 randomly to measure
the pulses coming from Alice, where |Ψ0〉 = |Φi〉 and |Ψ1〉 = |Φi + pi6 〉.
He records the receiving time t′i of each pulse and compares with the
sending time. If and only if t′i = ti+θ, he admits |Ψri〉 a receiving pulse.
From these receiving pulses, if and only if his measurement results in
state |Ψx〉⊥, he accepts a pulse as a conclusive pulse and takes the bit
value of this pulse as x⊕ 1.
6. Alice and Bob use the information reconciliation scheme mentioned in
Step 1 to reduce the error in the receiving bits.
If Alice can get a bit’s value and ensure that it is a conclusive bit, the
qubit Bob obtained must be in a pure state. Therefore, Alice cannot execute
EPR attack, and then, she cannot know whether a bit with a given value has
been taken as a conclusive bit by Bob.
Protocol 2. OT21 protocol
1. Alice and Bob execute protocol 1. Bob’s probability of getting a con-
clusive bit is pcon(µ), which is to be analyzed later. Therefore Bob is
supposed to obtain Npcon(µ) conclusive bits after this step.
2. Bob selects I = {i1, . . . , ik} and J = {j1, . . . , jk} with I ∩J = ∅. The k
bits ri1 , . . . , rik are chosen from his conclusive bits. In practice, if the
conclusive bits in Bob’s hand are a little less than k, he should random
adds it to k.
3. Bob chooses a random bit with value m. If m = 0, he sends {X, Y } =
{I, J} to Alice. Otherwise, he sends {X, Y } = {J, I}.
5
4. After receiving (X, Y ), Alice generates local random bit-string R0, R1 ∈
{0, 1}k and encrypts her messages b0, b1 as{
c0 = Ex(R0, b0) ∈ {0, 1}k+1, x = (ri|i ∈ X),
c1 = Ey(R1, b1) ∈ {0, 1}k+1, y = (ri|i ∈ Y ),
where x, y are the encryption keys. Alice sends c0, c1 to Bob and keeps
R0, R1 secret.
5. Bob decrypts that coming from Alice to obtain (Rm, bm) = Dkey(cm)
with key = (ri|i ∈ I).
In practice, the physical system and the coded bit string are necessary to
cause error. Therefore, this kind of OT protocols has a certain probability
of error. But it does not impact us to construct a bit commitment protocol.
If Alice regards the two bits in Protocol 2 as a committed bit, her best
cheating strategy is to commit 0 with a probability 1
2
and commit 1 with a
probability 1
2
. And change half of them in open phase. For each bit, the
probability that a cheating Alice can not be detected is 25%. Thus even the
error rate of OT21 is 20%, a cheating Alice could be detected by Bob.
We can construct a bit commitment protocol by executing the protocol l
times as follows:
Protocol 3. Bit commitment protocol
Commit phase:
1. Alice randomly divides her commit value as b = b
(i)
0 ⊕ b(i)1 , i = 1, . . . , l.
Then there are l same value of b.
2. Bob generates local random numbers {mi = 0, 1|i = 1, . . . , l}.
3. Alice executes protocol 2 with Bob l times, and Bob can obtain the
values {b(i)mi |i = 1, . . . , l} and {R(i)mi |i = 1, . . . , l}.
Open phase:
1. Alice opens {b(i)0 , b(i)1 ;R(i)0 , R(i)1 ; r(i)i1(i), . . . , r
(i)
ik(i)
; r
(i)
j1(i)
, . . . , r
(i)
jk(i)
|i = 1, . . . l}.
2. Bob verifies whether {b(i)0 , b(i)1 ;R(i)0 , R(i)1 ; r(i)i1(i), . . . , r
(i)
ik(i)
; r
(i)
j1(i)
, . . . , r
(i)
jk(i)
|i =
1, . . . l} is consistent with his {b(i)mi ;R(i)mi ; r(i)i1(i), . . . , r
(i)
ik(i)
|i = 1, . . . l} and
those conclusive bits in J. If the consistency holds, he admits Alice’s
commit value as b.
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4. Analysis on error rate
Alice and Bob use (63, 57, 3) Hamming code and the specific information
reconciliation scheme executed in Protocol 1 Step 5 is as follows.
1. lobt denotes the number of k bits in set I or J before using this scheme.
Alice divides both of lobt bits into 63-bit blocks and performs the wire
link permutation W on it. When lobt = 63
⌈
lobt
63
⌉ − ∆, ∆ bits of the
block in front should be added to the last block. Then calculate the
syndromes sAi and discard the check bits of each block. Repeat above
operations four times and send these syndromes to Bob.
2. Bob divides his lobt bits into 63-bit blocks and performs the wire link
permutation W on it. When lobt = 63
⌈
lobt
63
⌉−∆, ∆ bits of the block in
front should be added to the last block. For each round, he calculates
the syndromes sBi and si = sAi ⊕ sBi . Correct the error in each block
and discards all check bits.
After discard all check bits, the remain bits as the bits in set I or J in
Protocol 2.
k = 57
⌈
lobt
63
⌉
−∆ = lobt − 6
⌈
lobt
63
⌉
. (3)
Suppose the error rate of each bit in Protocol 1 is ε1 = 0.3%. After informa-
tion reconciliation, the error rate can be reduced to ε′1 = 0.0757%[15].
Assume as long as there is one bit error in key used in the decryption
algorithm, Bob can not obtain bm or Rm in Protocol 2. The error rate of
Protocol 2 is ε2. The relation of ε2 and ε
′
1 is
ε2 = 1− (1− ε′1)k (4)
When ε′1 = 0.0757%, ε2 is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: The error rate of Protocol 2 with respect to the size of sets
When the sets contain less than 295 bits, the error rate of Protocol 2 can
be less than 20%.
5. Analyze what Bob can obtain and determine the parameteres
5.1. Analysis on honest Bob
Let |n0〉 and |npi
6
〉 denote n-photon state of polarization 0 and pi
6
, respec-
tively. For an honest Bob, if he chooses the measurement bases B1 to detect
|10〉, the probability of the state collapse to |1 2pi
3
〉 is 1
4
. For |n0〉, the proba-
bility of at least one of the photons collapse to the state with polarization of
2pi
3
is 1− (3
4
)n
. Therefore, the probability of getting a conclusive resulting in
a pulse which contains n photons is
p(n) =
1
2
×
[
1−
(
3
4
)n]
. (5)
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From Equation(2) and Equation(5), the probability of getting a conclusive
bit in a pulse is
pcon(µ) =
∑
n=1
[pn(µ)× p(n)]
=
∑
n=1
{
1
2
[
1−
(
3
4
)n]
e−µµn
n!
}
=
1
2
[∑
n=1
e−µµn
n!
− e−µ4
∑
n=1
e−
3µ
4
(
3µ
4
)n
n!
]
=
1
2
(
1− e−µ4
)
.
(6)
It can be seen that an honest Bob is supposed to obtain Npcon(µ) con-
clusive bits. The probability of getting a conclusive bit in one pulse with
different µ can be seen in Figure 2. The larger µS of emission apparatus and
more efficient detector they use, the higher efficiency the protocol is.
Figure 2: The probability of an honest Bob gets a conclusive bit with respect to µ
5.2. Analysis on malicious Bob
A malicious Bob can separate n photons by photon number splitting
attack. For single-photon, the successful probability of optimal measurement
to differentiate the two non-orthogonal states is 1 − cosϕ, which has been
proven[16–18]. For n photons, a malicious Bob’s probability of differentiating
the two-orthogonal sates is
9
p′(n) = 1− cosnϕ. (7)
Then a malicious Bob using photon number splitting attack and optimal
measurement for single-photon can get conclusive bits with the probability
of
p′con(µ) =
∑
n=1
pn(µ)× p′(n) = 1− e−µ(1−
√
3
2
). (8)
Here we consider that the malicious Bob has an ideal detector, the quan-
tum efficient η′D of which is 1. Thus, µ
′ = µSηC =
µ
ηD
. Assume the protocols
are executed over atmospheric channel, the quantum efficiency of honest
Bob’s detector ηD is 80% and this kind of detector has been already realized
in laboratory. The cheating Bob’s probability of getting a conclusive bit is
p′′con(µS) = 1− e−
5µ
4
(1−
√
3
2
) (9)
A malicious Bob will get about 1− e− 5µ4 (1−
√
3
2
)N conclusive bits.
Figure 3: The probability of a malicious Bob gets a conclusive bit with respect to µ
5.3. Contrastive analysis
The difference between an honest Bob’s probability of obtaining a con-
clusive bit and half of a malicious Bob’s probability of obtaining a conclusive
bit is pdiff (µ) = pcon(µ)− 12p′′con(µ), which can be seen in Fig 4.
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Figure 4: The difference between an honest Bob’s probability of obtaining a conclusive bit
and half of a malicious Bob’s probability of obtaining a conclusive bit with respect to µ
When µ = 4.85, the function has a maximum 0.0732. The probability of
obtaining i conclusive bits is pobt, which is referred to the binomial distribu-
tion.
Figure 5: The solid line denotes the probability of an honest Bob obtains i conclusive bits
when N = 800, µ = 5. It can be seen an honest Bob can obtain more than 259 conclusive
bits with a great probability. The dashed line denotes the probability of a malicious Bob
obtains i+ 259 conclusive bits.
5.4. Determine the parameters in practical protocols
Suppose the probability of the cases that the number of conclusive bits
obtained by an honest Bob is equal to or less than lobt be p1, and the proba-
bility of the cases that the number of conclusive bits obtained by a malicious
11
Bob is equal to or greater than 2lobt be p2.
p1 =
lobt∑
i=0
CiN [pcon(µ)]
i[1− pcon(µ)]N−i (10)
p2 =
N∑
i=2lobt
CiN [p
′
con(µ)]
i[1− p′con(µ)]N−i (11)
As the honest Bob should execute Protocol 2 successfully and the malicious
Bob can not obtain both b0 and b1, p1 and p2 should be small enough.
The probability of an honest Bob cannot execute Protocol 2 successfully
is p.
p = 1− (1− ε2)(1− p1). (12)
To detect a cheating Alice, p should less than 20%. Given a ε2, p1 has a
upper bound p1t to ensure p ≤ 20%. To ensure the concealing of the bit
commitment protocol, p2 should be controlled to be a magnitude of 10
−6.
Table 1: When p = 20%, N = 800, p2 is controlled to be a magnitude of 10
−6, the selection
of parameters with different µ.
µ pcon(µ) p
′
con(µ) lobt k ε2 p1t p1 p2
2 0.197 0.285 143 131 0.0944 0.117 0.107 3.25× 10−6
3 0.264 0.395 190 172 0.122 0.0887 0.0484 1.85× 10−6
4 0.316 0.488 228 210 0.147 0.0621 0.0312 1.53× 10−6
5 0.357 0.567 260 236 0.164 0.0435 0.0324 7.45× 10−7
6 0.388 0.634 283 259 0.178 0.0267 0.0236 4.73× 10−6
When µ is too low, the difference between the probability of obtaining a
conclusive bit by an honest or a malicious Bob is not large enough to select
proper parameters. When µ is too large, a proper k is too large to lead to a
large ε2 and we cannot select proper parameters either. It can be seen from
Table 1, when 2 ≤ µ ≤ 6, we can always find other proper parameters to
execute the protocols successfully.
6. Security
6.1. Concealing of bit commitment protocol
Suppose the probability of a malicious Bob obtains both of two messages
in OT 21 protocol p2 is controlled to be a magnitude of 10
−6, the times of
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executing OT 21 protocol in bit commitment protocol l is 25, a malicious Bob
can obtain what Alice has committed before open phase with a probability
of
pbr = 1− (1− 10−6)25 ≈ 2.5× 10−5 (13)
In practical protocol, the probability of breaking the concealing of bit com-
mitment around 5× 10−5 is allowed.
6.2. Binding of bit commitment protocol
When Alice tries to attack the binding of bit commitment protocol, she
changes the value of b
(i)
0 or b
(i)
1 . But some of these values are fixed after
execute Protocol 2, and Alice has no idea about which bits Bob obtains,
even no-go attack can not help. If OT 21 is secure, what she only can do is
to choose randomly the changing bit between b
(i)
0 and b
(i)
1 for each i. The
probability that Bob can obtain a correct b0 or b1 successfully is 1− p = 0.8
and the probability that a cheating Alice can be detected is 0.4. Therefore,
for l = 25, Alice’s success probability of attacking is
p′br = (1− 0.4)25 ≈ 2.8× 10−6 (14)
In practical protocol, the probability of breaking the binding of the bit com-
mitment around 2.8× 10−6 is allowed.
7. Discussions
In this paper, we analyze the situation that the protocols are executed
on atmospheric window with a high efficiency detector of 80%. Otherwise, if
a malicious Bob has a greater ability to obtain information near Alice’s site
and has a super channel, the transfer efficiency could be 100%. To defend the
attack, the efficiency of transfer and an honest Bob’s detector ηCηD should
be increased to 80%.
If we execute the protocols in optical fiber, the bit commitment protocol
can be realized between two parties with a long distance. For a malicious Bob
who uses photon number splitting attack and has a detector with a efficiency
less than ηD/80%, the analysis and security of the protocol also hold true. It
means that our protocols is probably applied over a long distance in future.
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8. Conclusion
Based on two non-orthogonal states, we construct a random oblivious
transfer protocol. Then we construct a one-out-of-two oblivious transfer pro-
tocol on top of the random OT protocol. Finally, we present a bit com-
mitment protocol based on the one-out-of-two protocol. The security of
concealing is kept by measurement hypothesis and superposition principle of
state in quantum mechanics. Since the no-go theorem type attack can not
work because of random |Φi〉, the binding of the bit commitment protocol
is secure[14]. By using weak coherent pulses and allowing some error, our
protocols can be applied in practice. With the advent of the higher efficiency
detectors in optical fiber, our protocol can be realized with a long distance.
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